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Abstract
Large numbers of South Africans receive social grants (public transfers) or remittances (private transfers), and yet one in four
South Africans is food insecure. The purpose of this paper is to address two questions: do social grants and remittances improve
food security and nutritional outcomes? If so, do these impacts differ between public and private transfers? Drawing on the
National Income Dynamic Survey (NIDS), South Africa’s first nationally representative survey that follows more than 28,000
individuals over time, we found significant and positive impacts of the Older Person’s Grant and of remittances on the dietary
diversity index, but not of the Child Support Grant. Moreover, we found no effect on food expenditure or on anthropometry
(BMI) by the Older Person’s Grant, or remittances. However, some positive effects were found on children’s BMI from the Child
Support Grant. We discuss why we observe different effects from different transfers, as well as giving several reasons why
income transfers are failing to close the nutritional deficits in South Africa.
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1 Introduction
Social protection is a set of instruments that aim to alleviate
poverty and assist vulnerable people in managing risk
(Barrientos 2013; World Bank 2012). Narrow approaches re-
strict the definition to public policy interventions, and frame
social protection as a government responsibility towards citi-
zens, who have a right to claim social assistance or social
security from the state (ILO 2012). In this paper we favour a
broader approach that includes private as well as public
sources, following Brunori and O’Reilly (2010: 2): Bsocial
protection is generally described as the set of public and pri-
vate mechanisms that protect and prevent individuals and
households from suffering the worst consequences of shocks
and stresses^. Specifically, we focus on publicly provided
social grants (government-to-person (G2P) transfers) and on
privately provided remittances (transfers within extended
families).
In this paper, we examine and compare the impacts of
social grants and remittances on one set of wellbeing out-
comes, namely food security and nutrition, using South
Africa as a case study. Food security is commonly understood
as having access to sufficient food for a healthy, active life. It
is a basic human need, and the right to food is enshrined in
South Africa’s Constitution. Nutrition status, notably under-
nutrition, is an objective measure of food insecurity and
hunger.
Although several studies have looked at whether social
grants or remittances improve food security and/or nutritional
outcomes, few of them have looked in the same study at a
comprehensive set of indicators of food security and nutrition.
Moreover, to date and to the knowledge of the authors, there is
no evaluation that considers the effects of both social grants
and remittances on nutrition and food security. There are sev-
eral factors that differ across transfers and may influence
whether public transfers are more effective than private ones
(or vice versa) in reducing food insecurity, such as the fre-
quency and regularity of the payments, the size of the trans-
fers, and the use of the transfers (how transfers are spent). For
* Jennifer Waidler
Jennifer.waidler@maastrichtuniversity.nl
1 UNU-MERIT, Maastricht University, Boschstraat 24, 6211AX,
Maastricht, The Netherlands
2 UNICEF Office of Research-Innocenti, Florence, Italy
3 Centre of Excellence in Food Security, University of Western Cape,
Cape Town, South Africa
4 Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, Library
Road, Falmer BN1 9RE, UK
Food Security (2019) 11:679–702
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12571-019-00918-x
example, public transfers tend to be regular and predictable
but insensitive to variations in household needs over time,
whereas private remittances might be more erratic but more
responsive to occasional spikes in household needs for cash
(such as an expensive health shock). Comparing public and
private transfers can give us a better idea of the effectiveness
of social protection programmes, as compared to private strat-
egies such as sending informal transfers (remittances) to a
family member living in a different location.
South Africa makes an excellent case study for several
reasons: its history of internal migration and the fact that many
families have relied and still rely on remittances; its compre-
hensive social protection system which has become more ex-
tensive post-Apartheid; and the fact that levels of malnutrition
have remained high despite many poor households being re-
cipients of social grants and/or remittances (Hendriks 2014;
Devereux and Waidler 2017).
The paper is organised as follows: the next section reviews
the literature on the impacts of social grants as well as of
remittances on food security and nutrition, both in South
Africa and in other countries. The paper continues with a
description of the data and indicators used in our analysis,
followed by the empirical strategy used to estimate the im-
pacts of remittances and social grants on food security and
nutrition. Afterwards, we present the descriptive statistics
and the findings, before explaining and discussing the results
and, finally, concluding.
2 Literature review
Public income transfers (social grants) and private income
transfers (remittances) are both expected to improve the food
security of recipients, through direct as well as indirect chan-
nels. The theory of change is that an increase in income will
increase expenditure on food, which translates into increases
in food intake and dietary diversity. This effect will be larger
in poor households, who tend to allocate most of any incre-
mental income to food purchases, because of ‘Engel’s law’ –
poorer people spend higher proportions of their total
income on food. Increased quantity and quality of food
consumption should improve the nutritional status of
transfer recipients directly. Indirectly, if some incremen-
tal income is allocated to health care this can also pos-
itively affect nutrition, because healthier people absorb
and utilise nutrients more effectively (DFID 2011; Bailey and
Hedlund 2012).
Several factors, however, will influence the extent to which
social grants and remittances improve food security outcomes,
as well as whether different transfers affect the outcomes dif-
ferently. These factors include the frequency and regularity of
the payments, the size of the transfers, and the use of the
transfers (how transfers are spent) (Hagen-Zanker and
Himmelstine 2015). One may expect that the greater the size
of the transfer, the greater the poverty reduction effect – or, for
our purposes, the greater the improvement in food security.
Moreover, regular and predictable transfers are expected to
lead to better outcomes, as compared to infrequent or irregular
payments (Daidone et al. 2015). While social grants are usu-
ally regular and predictable, the frequency of remittances de-
pends highly on the economic situation of the sender. When
remittances come mainly from poor households, Bfamily
members may not be in a position to provide assistance at
the time it is required and payments may not always be re-
ceived on time^ (Thomson and Posel 2002).
Regarding the use of the transfers, different transfers may
be spent differently, and this will ultimately affect their pov-
erty reduction impact (or, in this case, food security). How
recipients use the transfer can depend on the purposes of send-
ing the transfers (or the aim of the social protection pro-
gramme in place); who is the intended beneficiary of the trans-
fer (i.e. if the transfer targets children or other family mem-
bers); and on who is the recipient of the transfer (e.g. women
compared to men). For example, a few studies have shown
that transfers received by women tend to have a higher impact
on poverty reduction as they have a greater propensity to be
spent on basic needs such as food (Duflo 2003). These factors
(size of the transfer, regularity, sex of recipient, and intended
use of the transfer) are context-specific, given that the charac-
teristics of social protection transfers and remittances depend
on the country studied.
The fact that most social protection is provided by family,
community, and other informal sources has been acknowl-
edged by researchers and institutions such as the World
Bank and its Social Risk Management framework.
Consequently, formal social protection should be designed
in a way that complements informal strategies, or crowds
out others for good reasons (Shepherd et al. 2004).
Comparing the effects of remittances and social grants on
well-being outcomes such as food security is necessary to
inform policy making on the effectiveness of different sources
of social protection.
2.1 Effects of social grants on food security
Numerous evaluations of public cash transfer programmes
(CTPs) analyse their impact on self-reported food secu-
rity indicators, while a smaller number of studies mea-
sure their impact on nutritional status (see Manley et al.
2012; Bastagli et al. 2016), usually of children in grant
receiving households.
There is widespread evidence that cash transfers increase
access to food and food consumption, and reduce food inse-
curity. A review of the impacts of conditional cash transfers on
household food security in Mexico and Nicaragua found sig-
nificant increases in per capita caloric availability, diet quality
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(consumption of vegetables, fruit and animal products) and
dietary diversity (Hoddinott and Wiesmann 2010).1 An eval-
uation of the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) in
Ethiopia found that food insecure households which received
free cash or food transfers as unconditional ‘direct support’ for
at least two years improved their food security – measured by
the number of months the household self-reported that it could
meet its food needs (0.4 months a year). This effect was great-
er for households receiving larger transfers, reaching
2.5 months in some cases (Berhane et al. 2011: 82).
Empirical evidence on nutritional impacts is more limited,
more variable and more ambiguous than data on self-reported
food security indicators. The Mchinji Social Cash Transfer
Scheme inMalawi recorded a substantial fall in the proportion
of children with stunted growth, from 55% to 46% in just one
year, while the prevalence of stunting in control group house-
holds remained unchanged – a significant attributable impact
(Miller et al. 2011). On the other hand, a randomised con-
trolled trial in Zambia found that households receiving regular
cash transfers from the Child Grant Programme increased
their food expenditure, food consumption (meals per day)
and dietary diversity, relative to a control group, but these
positive food security impacts did not translate into improve-
ments in children’s nutritional status for the full sample.
However, stunting was significantly reduced for children with
educated mothers and for children with access to clean water
(Seidenfeld et al. 2014: 41).
A systematic review covering 15 cash transfer programmes
in 10 countries found no consistent relationship between re-
ceiving cash transfers and child nutritional status. BHalf of the
programmes showed positive effects and half negative effects
on weight for age, and the same is roughly true for weight for
height z-scores^ (Manley et al. 2012: 43).2 Interestingly, that
review found no difference in nutritional outcomes between
conditional and unconditional cash transfers, no effect of larg-
er payment sizes, and a positive but statistically insignificant
effect of longer programme duration. The authors conclude by
noting that: Balmost every programme was associated with
increased food consumption and/or food diversity, a positive
development. However, we see no effects on nutritional status.
Clearly improved access to food alone is not sufficient to
improve nutritional status^ (Manley et al. 2012: 65). A more
recent systematic review found that seven of 12 studies re-
corded a statistically significant increase in dietary diversity,
and five of 13 studies found statistically significant reductions
in child stunting (an indicator of long-term deprivation), but
only one study of five and one study of eight found reductions
in child wasting (an indicator of short-term hunger) and un-
derweight, respectively (Bastagli et al. 2016). This is interest-
ing as it suggests that regular cash transfers can reverse the
effects of long-term nutritional deficits.
Recently, holistic package approaches that deliver cash
transfers together with other forms of support, such as health
insurance, access to microfinance and behaviour change com-
munication (BCC) – have demonstrated more powerful im-
pacts than cash transfers alone (Roelen et al. 2017). One pilot
project in Bangladesh found that a combination of ‘cash +
BCC’, where cash was complemented by nutrition training,
performed significantly better than when cash only, food only,
cash + food or food + BCC was delivered. In households that
received cash+BCC, child stunting rates fell by 7.3 percentage
points, but no other modality registered a significant impact on
child undernutrition (Ahmed et al. 2016: 158).
2.2 Effects of remittances on food security
Studies looking at the effects of remittances on food security
focus mainly on nutritional outcomes, especially of children,
and the evidence so far is inconclusive as studies found pos-
itive, negative, as well as no effects of remittances on nutri-
tion. Looking at international remittances (sent by migrants
living abroad) and nutritional outcomes in Ecuador, Antón
(2010) found a positive impact on short-term and medium-
term child nutritional outcomes, but no significant impact of
remittances on long-run anthropometric indicators. On the
other hand, Ponce et al. (2011) – also in Ecuador and using
a different instrumental variable technique – found no effect of
remittances on nutrition. In Guatemala, Davis and Brazil
(2016) showed that international remittances have no influ-
ence on the nutritional status of children left behind (aged 3
or less), which could indicate that fathers are not able to im-
prove their economic situation soon enough to make an im-
pact on their children’s nutrition. Finally, a panel study in
Mexico showed that migration (including remittances) had a
detrimental effect on children’s height-for-age (Nobles 2007).
Outside Latin America, Babatunde and Martinetti (2011)
found that remittance income contributed to improved calorie
supply at the household level in Nigeria, but had no significant
impact on diet quality, micronutrient supply, and child nutri-
tional status, while a recent study in Tanzania using an instru-
mental variable approach (Isotto and Kraybill 2017) showed
that remittances increased the intake of nutrients such as pro-
teins, vitamin A, vitamin C and calcium. In Ethiopia, Abadi
et al. (2013) found that migration and remittances improved
food security by allowing households to consume better
quality and greater quantities of food, as well as a reduction
in the frequency and severity of harmful coping strategies,
such as reducing the quantity or quality of food consumed.
1 Unconditional transfers – as opposed to conditional cash transfers – are not
conditional upon certain behaviors, such as school attendance or regular med-
ical check-ups.
2 Stunting, measured by height-for-age z-scores (HAZ), is an indicator of
long-term or chronic undernutrition. A child has stunted growth if her or his
height is more than 2 standard deviations below the height of a child the same
age in a reference population. Wasting, measured by weight-for-height z-
scores (WHZ), is an indicator of short-term weight loss and hunger.
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In China, however, De Brauw and Mu (2010) find no signif-
icant association between internal migration and the preva-
lence of underweight in children.
From a review of these studies we conclude that remit-
tances, such as social grants, are likely to improve food secu-
rity (in terms of food consumption and the quality of food
consumed). However, the impact of remittances on nutrition
–which is a measure of long-term well-being – is more incon-
clusive than the impact on food security, as positive effects of
remittances on nutrition are not always observed. Moreover,
the discussion on internal remittances remains Bvirtually non-
existent^ (McKay and Deshingkar 2014: 5), with the excep-
tion of some studies which have shown that internal remit-
tances usually flow to a large number of poor and rural house-
holds (Castaldo et al. 2012) and have the potential of reducing
poverty and building human capital (Adams 2005; Lokshin
et al. 2010; Taylor et al. 2005). Studies on internal remit-
tances in middle income countries have shown that, while
international remittances are more effective in decreasing
poverty, internal remittances have a more equalising effect
as they are better targeted at poor households (Taylor et al.
2005). The reason for this is that costs of international
migration are higher, and therefore international migrants
do not originate from the poorest households, whereas in-
ternal migration is often more concentrated among poor
families.
2.3 Comparing the effects of social grants
and remittances
To date and to the knowledge of the authors, there are no em-
pirical studies that compare the effects of remittances and social
grants on food security (including nutrition). There are, how-
ever, a few studies that look at the effects of social grants and
remittances on other well-being indicators, such as health, in-
come poverty and education. Hagen-Zanker and Himmelstine
(2015) summarises these studies, and conclude that in most of
them both types of transfers have a positive impact on
household wellbeing. When looking at the magnitude of the
impact, however, remittances appear to have a larger poverty
reduction effect, most likely due to a higher level of the transfer
and the fact that in these specific case studies remittances are
better targeted at poor households. In addition, Waidler et al.
(2016) compared the effects of remittances and social grants on
expenditure patterns in Moldova and concluded that public and
private transfers were not spent in the same way.
2.4 Social grants and remittances in South Africa
2.4.1 Social Grants
South Africa’s Department of Social Development (DSD) ad-
ministers seven social grants, which target poor individuals
from vulnerable demographic groups. The largest is the
Child Support Grant (11.9 million beneficiaries), followed
by the Older Person’s Grant (3.2 million) and the Disability
Grant (1.7 million).
The Child Support Grant (CSG) is a monthly cash transfer
for poor children up to 18 years old. Between the years 2008
and 2012, eligibility for the CSG was extended from 14 years
old in 2008, to 16 years old in 2010 and to 18 years old in
2012. The CSG is means tested against household income,
with an eligibility threshold that is double that of
single personsfor married spouses. Because poverty is wide-
spread it reaches two-thirds of all children in South Africa.
The CSG is received by the child’s primary care-giver, who
must be a South African citizen, permanent resident or refu-
gee. Children aged 7–18 years are required to attend school as
a condition for receiving the CSG, but this is not enforced. The
amount paid by the CSG as of 2018 is R400 per month (±€25)
(SASSA 2018).
The Older Persons Grant (OPG), also known as the Old
Age Grant, is means tested and currently reaches more than 3
million pensioners. It can be claimed by any citizen, perma-
nent resident or refugee who is resident in South Africa, is
aged 60 years or older, and whose income plus assets fall
below poverty thresholds that are adjusted periodically. The
value of the OPG as of 2018 is R1,700 per month (±€100)
(SASSA 2018).
There is evidence from several household surveys and im-
pact evaluations that the nutrition status of children in house-
holds receiving social grants has improved. A 1999 survey
found that children living with Old Age Grant (OAG) recipi-
ents were significantly taller, by approximately one standard
deviation in height-for-age (Case 2001). Analysis of a 1993
survey found an increase in height-for-age z-scores (HAZ) of
1.16 standard deviations for girls living with a female OAG
recipient (usually the child’s grandmother), but a much small-
er increase for boys, and no significant impact on HAZ
for either boys or girls living with a male OAG recip-
ient (Duflo 2003).3
An analysis of a subnational panel dataset, the KwaZulu-
Natal Income Dynamics Study (KIDS), found a significant
positive impact of the CSG on child stunting. Boys who
started receiving the CSG in their first year gained 0.40 in
HAZ by three years of age, compared to boys in the control
group (Agüero et al. 2007). An impact evaluation of the CSG
conducted in 2011 found no impact of the CSG on stunting
across the full sample. BHowever, it improves anthropometric
measures for two sub-samples, girls and children whose
mothers have eight or more grades of schooling^ (DSD,
SASSA and UNICEF 2012).
3 The Old Age Grant has subsequently been renamed the Older Person’s
Grant.
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Finally, an analysis of the first wave of NIDS panel dataset
by Coetzee (2013) found a significant but small impact of the
Child Support Grant on child HAZ, amounting to just 0.04 of
a standard deviation. BThese effect sizes are much smaller
than expected, given the relative size of the transfer in relation
to the mean per capita household expenditure of households in
the sample^ (Coetzee 2013: 429).
These empirical findings suggest that the positive nutrition-
al impacts on children of the Old Age Grant, which is intended
to be spent on the basic needs of older persons, are consistent-
ly larger than the impacts of the Child Support Grant, which is
‘labelled’ as a transfer intended for children. One factor might
be the fact that the OAG pays substantially more than the
CSG, and large numbers of older persons in South Africa
are caring for grandchildren, either orphaned or living with
themwhile the child’s parents are working or looking for work
elsewhere – so the OAG becomes a main source of income
and food security for both older persons and children.
2.4.2 Remittances
The most common form of human mobility in South Africa
has been rural to urban migration (Crush et al. 2005), as rural
areas are characterised by high levels of poverty and limited
economic activity. During apartheid, movements of labour
were mainly temporary, due to the fact that the permanent
settlement of migrants was highly restricted (Posel 2001).
Following the democratic transition in 1994, this trend was
not altered as expected, and migration remains cyclical, al-
though the proportion of female temporary migrants has in-
creased (Collinson 2010). Rural poverty in South Africa re-
mains high at around 70% (Stats SA 2014) and, due to the fact
that productive land has been highly concentrated among the
white population, poor households in South Africa continue to
rely on remittances to cover their daily needs (Posel and
Casale 2006). Nevertheless, analysing the National Income
Dynamics Survey of 2008, Posel (2009) points out that
many labour migrants were settling in destination areas
to which they moved and that ties between migrants
and households of origin were weakening. This trans-
lates into a sharp decline in the number of households
receiving remittances compared to statistics derived from pre-
vious household surveys.
There are no studies – to the knowledge of the authors –
looking at the effects of remittances on nutrition or food secu-
rity in South Africa. There are some studies, however, that
analyse the effects of remittances on poverty in post-
apartheid South Africa.4 Woolard and Klasen (2004) found
in a study covering the years 1993 to 1998 that remittances
were associated with a decrease in poverty in KwaZulu-Natal,
while Maitra and Ray (2003) showed that remittances had a
significant positive impact on the share spent on food.
According to Collinson (2010), in South Africa there is a
household selection effect, whereby better-off households
are more likely to send migrants since they have more
resources and better connections. After controlling for
selection, the author showed that temporary migration
improved the socio-economic status of the households,
mainly through remittances.
In households where remittances decrease poverty and ex-
penditure on food increases, food security indicators are ex-
pected to improve.
3 Data and indicators
For this analysis we used the National Income Dynamic
Survey (NIDS), South Africa’s first nationally representative
panel survey that follows more than 28,000 individuals over
time. The first round was conducted in 2008 and subsequent
rounds were carried out in 2010, 2012 and 2014. NIDS cap-
tures data on the livelihoods of individuals and households
and therefore collects information on a range of socio-
economic variables, such as income, employment, expendi-
ture, migration, shocks, education and health. In this study we
used only rounds 1 and 2, as some of the indicators used in our
analysis had a large number of missing values in round 3, and
round 4 was not available at the time of the study. Data
also suffer from attrition due to non-response and refus-
al. To account for household- and individual-level attri-
tion we used post-stratification calibrated weights when
reporting cross-section analysis and panel weights when
reporting on the balanced panel.
Income data in NIDS was collected individually by asking
every adult from the household the amount they received per
month from each income source (such as wage income, bonus
payments, income from self-employment, also social
grants and remittances). In the case of child grants
(such as the Child Support Grant), adults were asked
whether they received the specific grant on behalf of a
child. Remittances are defined in the NIDS survey as all
contributions from non-resident members as well as
non-household members. We define all income variables
in per capita terms. Finally, income and expenditure variables
were deflated to 2008 as the base period. Deflators were com-
puted from CPI data taken from the South African statistical
office (Stats SA).
Our outcome variables consist of three indicators of
food security: total expenditure on food, dietary diversi-
ty, and body mass index. All three indicators are objec-
tive, as subjective indicators were only available for the
first round.
4 Due to lack of a nationally representative survey that can explore trends in
migration, studies on migration and remittances in South Africa are limited.
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3.1 Dietary diversity index
Dietary diversity is considered one of the best performing
measures of food security (Hoddinott and Yohannes 2002)
and nutritional adequacy, including in South Africa (Steyn
et al. 2006). The Household Dietary Diversity Score indicator
guide identifies twelve food groups based on the United
Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation’s Food
Composition Table for Use in Africa (Ryan and Leibbrandt
2015).5 Following this reasoning, the food items listed in the
NIDS dataset were grouped into 12 food groups, based on the
FAO’s table: cereals; white tubers and roots; vegetables; fruits;
meat; eggs; fish and other seafood; legumes, nuts and seeds;
milk and milk products; oils and fats; sweets; spices, condi-
ments and beverages.
Detailed data on expenditure was collected at the house-
hold level by asking the amount of money the household spent
in the last month on each particular food item (as well as
whether the household has consumed it or not). The period
of food consumption in NIDS was the previous 30 days.
While an increase in the number of food categories consumed
gives a good indication of improved food access and food
security, there is no established threshold of the number
of categories a household needs to consume to be de-
fined as Bfood secure^. While the HDDS guide suggests
taking the average diversity of the upper tercile, we
follow Ryan and Leibbrandt (2015) using the same
dataset and take average dietary diversity as a cut-off
point (so that households below the average are consid-
ered food insecure). The main reason for this is that the
average dietary diversity index (DDI) score is as high as 9 in
NIDS, probably due to the long recall period for consumption
(which is one month, compared to the 24 h recall period rec-
ommended by the HDDS guide).
3.2 Food expenditure
Food expenditure is a common indicator of food security. The
rationale is that households that spend a high proportion of
their total expenditure on food are more vulnerable than
households that spend a lower proportion (Maxwell
et al. 1999; Johnson and Toole 1991). This is because
households that spend a large share of their income on
food are more vulnerable to changes in food prices, as
well as to changes in income.
Despite the fact that food expenditure does not perfectly
capture the quality or quantity of food consumed (as this de-
pends on availability and prices, and it also does not capture
food produced for own consumption), food expenditure is still
a useful measure to add to the analysis. The variable is defined
as the household share of monthly food expenditure out of
total expenditure. As suggested by Maxwell et al. (1999), a
high food expenditure proportion is regarded as 60% and
above, and these households are classified as food insecure.
In this case we only analyse the binary variable as the contin-
uous one is difficult to interpret.
3.3 Anthropometrics
We calculated the BMI for children aged 6 to 14 years, as well
as for adults (above 14 years old). We analysed these two
samples separately, as the BMI of adults is more likely to
remain relatively constant over time. BMI is calculated as
weight divided by height squared and it is derived from the
anthropometric data collected in the adult and child individual
surveys. Children who have a BMI more than 2 standard de-
viations below the median BMI for the reference group are
classified as undernourished (Dinsdale et al. 2011). The clas-
sification of adults is less complex, with one threshold applied
to all individuals over the age of 14. A BMI below 18.5 is
identified as underweight and a BMI above 24.9 is identified
as overweight.
Although anthropometric data was available for chil-
dren under 5 and we were able to create the indicators
for stunted and wasted (based on the z-scores for
height-for-age and weight-for-height respectively), in
the second round of the survey many children had miss-
ing values for these variables and therefore it was not
possible to analyse nutrition with panel estimators for
this age group.
4 Empirical strategy
We took advantage of the longitudinal nature of the data and
estimated the relationship between transfers and food security
via fixed effects regression. We also performed random
effects and Mundlak estimates for robustness, given that
some variables do not change considerably over time.
The Hausman test, however, always recommends the
use of fixed effects regressions. In the case of the die-
tary diversity index, we estimated random effects or-
dered probit regression (in addition to the linear fixed
effects regression) as it is an interval variable and can
only take 12 values, from 1 to 12.
Fixed effects regressions allow us to remove unobserved
time invariant heterogeneity, which is very likely to be present
in this study. Personal or household characteristics that are
unobserved, like for example eating habits, are likely to affect
food security outcomes and at the same time be correlated
with the independent variables, therefore causing estimate bi-
as. However, as it seems plausible to assume these variables
stay constant over time, we can remove this bias by
5 For more information on the food composition table, see: www.fao.org/
docrep/003/X6877E00.htm.
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introducing individual fixed effects. The model can be
expressed as follows:
FSit ¼ β1CSGit þ β2Remittancesit þ β3OPGit þ β4HHit
þ β4Y it þ αi þ ϵit ð1Þ
where FS are the different food security outcome indicators.
The coefficients of interest are the CSG, OPG, and remittances
which denote, respectively, per capita monthly income (in
Rands) from the Child Support Grant, Older Person’s Grant
and remittances. The HH term refers to various household
characteristics that can change over time, such as number of
adults and children living in the household, maximum level of
education attained in the household, and whether the house-
hold is located in a rural, urban formal, or informal area.6 Y
denotes the year fixed effects (in this case 2008) and αi +
ϵitrefers to the error term which in this case is divided into
two terms: αiis the time invariant error (the individual fixed
effect) and ϵitis the time variant error, which is assumed to be
random and uncorrelated with the independent variables.
As we are not only interested in analysing how transfers
affect the continuous outcomes (values of BMI and DDI), but
also how transfers affect the probability of being food secure
(being not underweight and not overweight in the case of
adults, and having an above average DDI in the case of the
whole household), we estimated fixed effects (conditional)
logits to see how an increase in the Older Person’s Grant,
remittances, and Child Support Grant changed the odds of
being food secure.7 In this case eq. (1) remains the same with
the only difference that the dependent variable is replace by
the binary measures of food security.
Given that both social transfers and remittances were not
randomly assigned to recipients, the model could still suffer
from endogeneity if there were omitted variables that were
time variant and affected both the treatment and the outcome.
For instance, if there were a shock that caused a change in
food security outcomes and, at the same time, generated a
response in the remitter or the government by increasing or
decreasing transfers, our coefficients could be biased. In the
absence of proper instruments for all three transfers, we per-
formed the estimates separately for different population
groups to test for heterogeneity in effects. We re-estimated
the model (1), restricting the sample to the African population
in order to compare public and private transfer within a more
homogenous group; and (2) restricting the sample to
households that received social transfers (and that could or
could not receive remittances).
As an additional robustness check and to better correct for
potential endogeneity, we implemented some standard tools of
policy evaluation and looked at the effects of the Child
Support Grant and the Older Person’s Grant separately. The
reason why we could not analyse both transfers in the same
model is that, in order to implement quasi-experimental tech-
niques such as propensity score matching or instrumental var-
iable estimate (in cases where an instrument was available),
we could only analyse one treatment at a time. In the case of
remittances, it was not possible to find a valid instrument or
variables that were good predictors of recipient status. As a
result and given that we could not estimate causal impacts, we
will only talk about associations when discussing the relation-
ship between remittances and the different food security
outcomes.
5 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 shows descriptive information on the percentage of
households receiving the Older Person’s Grant (OPG), the
Child Support Grant (CSG), and remittances – as well as com-
binations of these – and no transfers. Almost 50% of the South
African population received either a poverty-related govern-
ment transfer (CSG or OPG) or private transfers (remittances).
The CSG was the transfer with the highest coverage, reaching
more than 40% of households (30% of which did not receive
either of the other two transfers). Of those households receiving
the OPG, more than half also received the CSG, which is con-
sistent with evidence of a high number of multi-generational
households in South Africa and with elderly individuals
pooling their income and living with children. The number of
households relying only on remittances was low and has been
decreasing over time (Posel and Casale 2006; Posel 2009), and
this can be seen in Table 1 with only 1.8% of households
receiving remittances in 2010 (compared with 5.7 in 2008).
In terms of the average amount received in recipient house-
holds, in 2008 remittances were much higher in magnitude
than government transfers. However, remittances do not nec-
essarily target poor families (this is consistent with the find-
ings from Collinson (2010)), and the high average is mainly
the result of high-income households receiving large amounts
of remittances (see Fig. 1 below). It is also important to point
out that in this survey remittances are defined as Bany contri-
bution from non-resident members or non-household
members^, which means that not only transfers from migrants
were included, but also other contributions such as child main-
tenance payments, payments to an elderly person living in
other households or to a child studying in another city. The
average amount received from the OPGmore than doubled the
amount received from the CSG: the value of the OPG was
6 Due to the fact that NIDS follows individuals and not households, some
individuals could move to another households (and therefore change location)
from one wave to the other.
7 We could not look at BMI for children (probability of being nourished) as
there were not enough individuals who changed their outcome (from being
under-nourished to nourished or vice versa) from one year to the other.
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actually almost four times the value of the CSG, but there were
many households with more than one child receiving the CSG.
When looking at the average per capita income before trans-
fers, one can see that in the year 2008, households that relied on
all three transfers were by far the poorest and households that
only received remittances were the richest (in the latter case
average income was similar to households receiving no trans-
fers). In 2010 remittance recipient households were also the
richest but those that received remittances and the OPG, or both
the OPG and CSG and no remittances were slightly poorer that
those receiving the three transfers. This could be due to the fact
that those receiving all three transfers decreased by half in 2010
due to a large decrease in the number of households receiving
remittances. It is curious to see that remittances reached both
rich and poor households, but when they reached poor house-
holds they often complemented or were complemented by gov-
ernment transfers. One explanation could be that social transfers
enable household members to go to the city and look for jobs in
order to sendmoney back home (Sienaert 2008; Ardington et al.
2009). Finally, the last row of Fig. 1 shows the percentage of
income that each grant represents, on average, in recipient
households. Households that received transfers were highly re-
liant on them, as generally more than 50% of per capita income
comes from transfers, reaching 78% in households receiving all
three transfers (the CSG, the OPG, and remittances).
Figure 1 shows the distribution of (a) the CSG, (b) remit-
tances, and (c) the OPG by expenditure decile. The CSG was
relatively effective in targeting poor households. Households
in the lower deciles of expenditure were more likely to receive
greater amounts of the CSG. The lowest expenditure decile
did not reflect this trend, which could be due to the fact that
there were fewer children in this decile, or that very poor
households did not apply for the grant due to lack of informa-
tion or resources.8 The opposite occured with remittances, as
richer households received larger amounts on average. One
explanation for this could be that richer households were in
a better position to send remittances, but one could also spec-
ulate that there was a (positive) displacement effect, where
remittances between poor people were crowded out by public
transfers, as some qualitative evidence points out (Du Toit and
Neves 2009).
The way transfers are targeted will determine their poverty
reduction impact. As remittances have been decreasing in size,
and a large proportion of them go to wealthier households, we
do not expect to see a big impact of remittances on food
security. At the same time, the amount of the CSG is too small
to have a sizeable impact, even on basic needs. The OPG lies
in between (Fig. 1c) – despite being weakly targeted, it is big
enough to have an effect on food security. The drawback is
that only households with elderly individuals benefit from this
transfer.
In terms of frequency, social transfers were received
monthly, whereas remittances were also received relatively
frequently, with a median of 10 times per year in recipient
households. Therefore, both private and public transfers were
received regularly. However, remittances can decrease consid-
erably during a crisis or with an idiosyncratic shock to the
sender, therefore reducing the impact of their poverty reduc-
tion. Regarding the sex of the recipient, child grants were
mainly received by women (97% in 2008 and 95% in 2010),
whereas in the case of remittances the proportion of female
recipients was lower but still very high (78 and 80% in 2008
and 2010, respectively). The decision on how money is spent
may not only depend on who receives the transfer but also on
who is the head of the household (which was self-defined in
the survey). In this regard, 67.7% of remittance recipient
households, 63.3% of CSG recipient households, and 67.5%
of OPG recipient households were headed by a female. Given
that there are no big differences between public and private
transfer recipients in terms of who is the head of the household
or who is the recipient of grants, we do not expect differences
8 Very poor households may be discouraged to apply if they lack the necessary
documents or have to travel far away to apply for the grant, or as a result of less
motivated caregivers.
Table 1 Economic characteristics by transfer recipient status









2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010
% Receiving transfers 6.5 9.8 26.3 28.9 5.7 1.8 5.3 2.1 1.2 0.4 7.1 10.4 1.2 0.6 46.8 46.1
Average amount received
(real 2008 prices)
1041 1154 431 510 2377 653 1005 1523 1103 1649 1555 1697 2086 2202 – –
Average pc income before
transfers (real)
400 446 277 463 1570 1073 312 435 351 245 136 296 105 315 – –
Average pc income after
transfers (real)
678 731 355 553 2359 1336 489 699 676 553 342 504 371 609 2552 3008
% of total income the
grant represents
73% 59% 49% 41% 52% 12% 56% 52% 70% 68% 71% 62% 78% 49% – –
Source: Authors’ calculations, NIDS 2008 and NIDS 2010. Post-stratification calibrated weights were applied
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in impacts between public and private transfers to be driven by
this factor.
Finally, the way households spend each specific grant and
who benefits from them will depend on whether transfers are
sent with a specific purpose and on the population group the
transfer is targeting. The CSG is targeted at children and there
is a clear message from the government that the grant is
intended to improve children’s wellbeing, including nutrition
and access to education. In the case of the OPG, even though
the grant is targeted at elderly individuals, there is evidence
that older persons usually live in households with children and
pool their income to help all members of the household, par-
ticularly children (Case 2001; Lloyd-Sherlock 2012; Case and
Menendez 2007). Consequently, we expect a positive effect of
the CSG on children’s food security, and of the OPG on chil-
dren as well as on adults’ food security (also due to the fact
that the OPG is larger in size as compared to other transfers).
In the case of remittances, we only expected to see improve-
ments in food security in poor households, as richer ones were
expected to be food secure. For poor households, remittances
are a household level transfer, which is expected to be poverty
reducing, as evidence from internal remittances points out
(Castalso et al. 2012). However, the extent of the improve-
ment will depend on how the money is distributed among
household members, and whether transfers are big enough to
cover basic needs.
Table 2 shows food security outcomes across the different
transfer recipient groups. Results are generally consistent
across groups, meaning that when we compare the different
food security indicators the ranking holds: households that
receive no transfers or only remittances are better off, follow-
ed by those receiving remittances and either the CSG or the
OPG. This group is followed by households receiving only the
OPG, only the CSG, both the OPG and the Child Support
Grant and finally by households receiving all three grants,
which are the most food insecure in terms of all indicators.
6 Results
For the econometric analysis, we looked at three continuous
indicators of food security (dietary diversity and body mass
index for adults and for children), and four binary indicators,
expressed as the odds of being food secure in terms of dietary
diversity (DDI higher than 8) and food expenditure (spending
less than 60% of total expenditure on food); being not under-
weight (BMI > 18.5); and being not overweight (BMI < 24.9)
(in both cases for adults older than 14 years old).9 We did not
estimate the regressions using the share of food expenditure as
a continuous variable given that results were hard to interpret,
as an increase in the share spent on food can be considered a
positive outcome if the household is poor but richer house-
holds spend a lower share of their income on food. Table 3
shows the fixed effects results when the dietary diversity index
was the dependent variable. While we did not see significant
9 We could not estimate conditional logits for child BMI (probability of being
nourished) as the sample was very small (very few individuals had changed
from being nourished to unnourished and vice versa.
a) Per capita CSG 
b) Per capita remittances



















































Fig. 1 Per capita income from social grants and remittances by
expenditure deciles (whole sample). a Per capita CSG. b Per capita
remittances. c Per capita OPG. Source: NIDS 2008
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impacts of the Child Support Grant, the Older Person’s Grant
was positive and significant in all specifications. Remittances
were positively associated with the DDI; although coefficients
were lower in magnitude compared to the OPG and coeffi-
cients were significant only at the 10% level. To have a clearer
idea of the magnitude of the coefficients, we examined the
results of the random effects ordered probit regressions (given
that the dependent variable is ordinal), expressed as average
marginal effects in Table 4. For this we have re-classified the
DDI in 9 categories (from 4 to 12), as very few individuals had
a DDI lower than 4. The regression shows that recipients of
the Older Person’s Grant as well as remittances had higher
probabilities of having a higher DDI. For instance, an increase
in 100 Rands of both per capita remittances and OPG in-
creased the probability of having a DDI of 12 by 1 percentage
point.
There are several explanations for why we see a positive
impact of the OPG but not of the CSG. In the first place, as
mentioned earlier, the OPG is approximately four times the
size of the CSG, so it is to be expected that this grant will have
a larger impact on household food security. Another reason is
that the DDI identifies well-being at a household level, and we
expect a higher effect from the OPG given that this grant is
usually pooled and benefits the whole household. In addition,
as discussed in Devereux and Waidler (2017), there is evi-
dence that the CSG is being Bdiluted^ in terms of what it is
spent on, as poor households have needs other than food as
well as recipients of the transfer –caregivers of children, many
of whom are teenagers- may be spending the grant on goods
that do not benefit their children directly. Finally, remittance
income is also a household level transfer, which is often spent
on food, so these results are consistent with previous evidence
from South Africa (Waidler 2016; Maitra and Ray 2003).
With regard to the effects of transfers on BMI (Tables 5 and
6) we observed no impacts of social protection transfers on
nutrition. The OPG is significantly related to child BMI in
some of the specifications, but coefficients are only significant
at the 10% level and do not hold when estimating random
effects and Mundlak models. Moreover, although the random
effects models show a negative effect of the OPG on adult
BMI, this significant effect disappeared when we estimated
Table 2 Food security outcomes by recipient status












2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010 2008 2010
Food adequacy
DDI(>8) (in%) 64.1 72.1 61.8 66.8 77.6 69.0 74.1 81.7 65.8 77.8 59.5 71.2 60.8 77.5 78.4 77.6
Average DDI 9.16 9.48 8.94 9.26 9.94 9.61 9.71 10.2 9.19 9.92 8.98 9.45 9.04 9.82 10.0 9.96
Average share spent on food 0.41 0.40 0.33 0.43 0.40 0.44 0.51 0.31
Expenditure on food > 60% (in%) 16.2 19.5 16.3 19.5 7.7 15.0 15.5 16.0 16.0 35.0 19.5 27.1 24.0 20.0 9.4 8.8
Nutrition (in %)
Underweight (BMI adults) 8.7 8.2 8.2 7.5 7.9 9.7 9.3 9.6 7.2 3.4 9.1 5.1 12.6 2.1 6.2 6.8
Overweight (BMI adults) 46.9 52.1 44.7 51.1 43.5 41.2 46.5 40.4 45.2 53.8 46.7 53.1 41.5 51.2 49.9 51.0
Obese (BMI adults) 26.7 27.8 24.6 28.7 18.3 19.5 23.5 32.8 27.3 22.9 25.3 30.1 20.8 23.3 24.7 28.1
Nourished (BMI children 5–14) 95.3 98.2 92.8 95.1 94.8 97.2 92 95.5 100 93.7 95.1 95.2 86.4 100 94.5 96.5
Subjective indicators (in %)
Child hungry 28.4 – 23.8 – 12.8 – 13.8 – 26.4 – 25.6 – 27.0 – 12.2 –
Adult hungry 31.6 – 30.7 – 19.5 – 19.9 – 28.5 – 32.7 – 30.5 – 15.2 –
Food adequate for hh needs 57.2 – 54.2 – 71.1 – 55.3 – 54.4 – 49.7 – 46.1 – 69.9 –
Source: Authors’ calculations, NIDS 2008 and NIDS 2010. Post-stratification calibrated weights were applied




Whole sample African sample Grant recipients
PC CSG 0.000 0.001+ 0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PC OPG 0.001** 0.001** 0.002**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PC remittances 0.000* 0.000* 0.000
Observations 37,057 30,803 24,731
Within R2 0.01 0.02 0.04
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; Panel
weights were used and full models are shown in the appendix; control
variables include income before transfers, household size and composi-
tion, living in rural, urban informal or urban formal areas, year, and
maximum level of education attained in the household. Estimates yielded
very similar results when standard errors were clustered at the individual
level.
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Mundlak regressions. This is likely caused by a negative se-
lection into social protection transfers, where individuals with
worse nutritional outcomes are more likely to receive transfers
from the government. Once we accounted for this by remov-
ing the correlation between the error term and time invariant
variables - through Mundlak or fixed effects models - coeffi-
cients were no longer significant. Remittances were not sig-
nificantly associated with nutritional outcomes either. Our
findings of no effect of transfers on BMI are in line with
previous findings that there is no consistent positive relation-
ship between grants and nutritional outcomes.
Finally, Table 7 shows the conditional logit expressed in
odds ratios when food security indicators are expressed as
binary variables. As with the fixed effects regression, we only
see significant impacts in the case of DDI: an increase in one
rand of per capita OPG increased the odds of being food
secure by 0.10%. In this case, however, the coefficient for
remittances was not statistically significant, while the Child
Support Grant appeared to be associated with an increased
probability of being food secure. The differences between
these results and the previous ones can be explained by the
fact that the number of observations significantly declined
when estimating conditional logit estimations, as only those
individuals who changed their status from 2008 to 2010 (e.g.
from being food insecure to food secure or vice versa) were
kept in the estimation. For this reason, these results should be
interpreted with caution. We did not see significant effects
when we analysed the odds of being neither overweight nor
underweight, and food secure in terms of share of expenditure
on food.
6.1 Endogeneity concerns: Additional estimates
Given that our data does not cover pre-program outcomes, and
that selection into treatment (receiving remittances and social
protection transfers) is not random, our study could still suffer
from endogeneity bias due to omitted-time varying vari-
ables.10 An even more problematic bias could be caused by
reverse causality, which would arise if the level of food secu-
rity and nutrition of individuals determine whether they re-
ceive remittances or social grants. As robustness tests, there-
fore, and based on data availability and characteristics of the
transfers, we performed some additional standard methods of
policy evaluation, namely propensity score matching and in-
strumental variable estimation. Given that we could not apply
the same econometric technique to analyse all three transfers,
we estimated the effects of each transfer separately. Another
reasonwhywe could not estimate them together is the fact that
beneficiaries of remittances, OPG, and CSG have different
characteristics, which means their corresponding control
groups will also be different.
In the case of the Older Person’s Grant, we were able to
instrument pension receipt with age eligibility, given that 80%
of age eligible individuals in South Africa receive the pen-
sion.11 This instrument has been used in other papers studying
the impacts of this transfer (see, for example, Standish-White
and Arden Finn (2015)). Results confirm our findings that
pension income improves food security (the dietary diversity
index), but has no effect on nutrition (Table 8). This holds
when we analyse the continuous variable (amount received),
as well as when estimating the effects of receiving or not
receiving the grant (binary variable).
In the case of the Child Support Grant, we relied on
matching techniques. In the absence of a good instrument,
other studies such as Coetzee (2013) and DSD, SASSA and
UNICEF (2012) have used this technique to estimate the ef-
fects of the CSG on different well-being indicators. To esti-
mate the treatment, we used variables that influence the prob-
ability of an individual living in a grant recipient household,
but were unlikely to be affected by the outcome, such as place
of residence, race, housing conditions, and the number of age-
eligible children in the household. All the estimates shown
below satisfy the balancing property (meaning that differences
in covariates between treated and control individuals are not
significant after matching), as well as post-estimate tests,
which indicated that the matching was done correctly.12 We
performed two different matching techniques: radius
matching, and nearest neighbour matching based on the three
closest neighbours.13
Table 9 below shows the average treatment effects of the
Child Support Grant on food security and nutrition. Again, we
see that the Child Support Grant had no effect on food security
(measured through the dietary diversity index), given that the
t-statistic was less than 1.96 when performing both radius
matching as well as nearest neighbour matching. The effects
on adults’ BMI were also insignificant. However, when esti-
mating the effects on BMI for children – and as opposed to the
estimates shown in the previous sub-section – we observed
positive effects from the CSG. Receiving the Child Support
Grant lead, on average, to a 0.39 or 0.50 standard deviation
increase in body mass index, depending on the matching tech-
nique used. The magnitude of this effect is quite considerable
given the distribution of this variable (see Table 10).
10 Although in the previous section we performed sub-sample analysis, trying
to overcome this limitation, restricting the sample to specific groups threatens
the external validity of the study.
11 Individuals (both men and women) who are 60 years old or above can
qualify for the grant.
12 The regression to estimate the propensity score as well as the post-estimate
tests are shown in the appendix.
13 Nearest neighbour matches a treated participant with its closest non-treated
participant (or, in our case, with the 3 closest non-participants), whereas radius
matching combines nearest neighbour matching with caliper matching.
Caliper matching imposes a restriction of a maximum permitted distance be-
tween the neighbours (avoiding in this way matching participants whose ab-
solute propensity score difference is high).
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Although results should be interpreted with caution given
that we could not use baseline characteristics to estimate the
probability of receiving the Child Support Grant,14 and that
propensity score matching only controls for selection on ob-
servables. However, the advantage of this technique is that it
allows us to create a proper counterfactual of non-participants
and to get an unbiased estimate of the effects of this pro-
gramme, provided all assumptions hold. This may be the rea-
son why findings differ with respect to our previous estimates,
and why we now observe positive effects of the CSG. These
positive effects on child nutrition are in line with previous
evaluations of the Child Support Grant (see, for example,
Coetzee (2013) and DSD, SASSA and UNICEF (2012)).
Even though some studies, including this one, have found
positive effects of the Child Support Grant on specific nutri-
tional indicators, a review of the literature indicates that the
levels of malnutrition in South Africa have not declined, or are
declining very slowly, as the proportion of stunted children in
South Africa has fluctuated between 20% and 30% since the
early 1990s (various sources, discussed in Devereux and
Waidler 2017). The next section, therefore, discusses why
we think this is the case.
With regard to remittances, it was not possible to find a
good instrument or to implement propensity score matching,
given that covariates that would be expected to influence the
probability of receiving remittances did not turn out to be
good predictors of treatment status. However, this also means
that the estimation of the effects of remittances is less likely to
suffer from endogeneity bias, as recipients and non-recipients
do not differ, on average, on some of the main socio-
demographic characteristics. One possible explanation for this
is that remittances can be received from both household and
non-household members, and therefore senders have different
characteristics and send remittances for different purposes. In
addition, not all remittances are sent by migrant household
members, and this lowers the likelihood of reverse causality.
Assuming that there is reverse causality, we would expect this
endogeneity to lead to downward bias, given that migrants are
more likely to be negatively selected in terms of income and
education, which would imply that remittance recipient house-
holds are, in general, less food secure on average (Jacobs and
du Plessis 2016). This would also imply that the effects of
remittances found in this paper would be under-estimated.
Finally, another discussion point that was mentioned in the
previous section is interactions between different types of
transfers, given that some households receive only one, others
two and others all three types. To explore whether, for in-
stance, public transfers ‘crowd out’ private transfers, we esti-
mated specifications that included only one resource inflow
and subsequently added the others to see if the effect of the
initial variable changed. With this exercise we can analyse if
households that receive all three transfer types have different
outcomes compared to those that only receive one, or con-
versely, if the effect of one transfer type disappears once the
household receives others. These regressions are shown in
Table 17 in the appendix. The effects of remittances, the
Child Support Grant and the Older Person’s Grant did not
change if analysed separately or together with the other trans-
fers. This means that there is no sign of crowding out – re-
ceiving one additional transfer does not necessarily reduce the
effect of the others.
7 Discussion: Why are social grants failing
to improve nutrition outcomes in South
Africa?
Empirical evidence points to a paradox in South Africa: self-
reported indicators of food insecurity are falling, but indicators
of malnutrition are not, or are falling much more slowly. In the
1990s, responses to the question BIn the past year, was there
ever a time when you could not afford to feed the children in
the household?^ in national annual household surveys
14 For the propensity score matching assumptions to be satisfied, potential
outcomes should be independent of treatment assignment. Therefore, in an
ideal case, we would use baseline characteristics of individuals (which pre-
date the start of the programme), to estimate the probability of receiving the
grant.
Table 4 Marginal effects of transfers on dietary diversity index – random effects ordered probit (whole sample)
DDI 1–4 DDI 5 DDI 6 DDI 7 DDI 8 DDI 9 DDI 10 DDI 11 DDI 12
PC CSG 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PC OPG −0.00003** −0.00002** −0.00002** −0.00003** −0.00003** −0.00002** 0.00000** 0.00004** 0.00010**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PC −0.00003** −0.00001** −0.00002** −0.00000** −0.00003** −0.00002** 0.00000** 0.00004** 0.00010**
Remittances (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; this regression also controls for household size and composition, income before transfers,
gender of household head, maximum age and level of education of the household, race, location (province and whether the household lives in rural or
urban area), housing and living conditions, and number of household members employed.
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displayed a steady decline (i.e. improvement), from 41% in
1994 to 31% in 1998 (Aliber 2009). In the 2000s, this positive
trend continued. Responses in national annual household sur-
veys to a slightly different question – BIn the past 12 months,
did any child in this household go hungry because there
wasn’t enough food?^ – registered a decline from 24% in
2002 to 11% in 2012 (Hendriks 2014).
Other sources broadly confirm this positive trend. The
National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey of 2012
(SANHANES-1) reported that Bthe proportion of food inse-
cure households halved from 1999 to 2008 (from 52.3% to
25.9%)^ and that this Bmarked improvement^was maintained
up to 2012 (HSRC 2013: 147). On the other hand, a report on
poverty and inequality in South Africa found that the
Household Food Insecurity Access Scale (derived from the
annual GHS surveys), deteriorated slightly between 2012
and 2015, suggesting Ba modest increase in food insecurity
since 2012^ (World Bank 2018: 24). Conversely, a national
community survey conducted by Statistics South Africa in
2016 found that 13.3% of households reported having skipped
a meal during the previous 12 months – a positive decline
from 16.7% in 2015 (Stats SA 2016: 87–88).
However, these self-reported indicators were not confirmed
when ch i ld ren ’s nut r i t ion s ta tus was measured
anthropometrically. The proportion of stunted children in
South Africa has fluctuated between 20% and 30% since the
early 1990s. The highest rate of 28.0% was recorded in 2003
and the lowest rate of 20.9% was recorded in 2012, but
Table 6 Fixed effects regressions – effect of transfers on child BMI
Fixed effects Random effects Mundlak
BMI child Whole sample BMI child African sample BMI child Grant recipients BMI childWhole sample BMI childWhole sample
PC CSG −0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PC OPG 0.002+ 0.002* 0.002 0.000 0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PC 0.001 0.001 −0.000 0.000 −0.000
Remittances (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 3780 3361 2857 3680 3680
Within R2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.06
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; Panel weights were used and full models are shown in the appendix; control variables
include household size and composition, income before transfers, living in rural, urban informal or urban formal areas, year, and maximum level of
education attained in the household. Random andMundlak estimates also control for race, location (province), housing and living conditions, number of
household members employed, age of the eldest member of the household and characteristics of the child that can influence their nutritional status
(whether the mother is alive, and subjective health status).
Table 5 Fixed effects regressions – effect of transfers on adult BMI











PC CSG −0.001 −0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PC OPG −0.000 −0.001 0.000 −0.001** −0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PC remittances −0.000 −0.000 0.001 −0.000 −0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 15,875 13,513 10,132 15,875 15,875
Within R2 0.03 0.04 0.06
Overall R2 0.16 0.17
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; Panel weights were used and full models are shown in the appendix; control variables
include household size and composition, income before transfers, living in rural, urban informal or urban formal areas, year, and maximum level of
education attained in the household. Random andMundlak estimates also control for race, location (province), housing and living conditions, number of
household members employed, and age of the eldest member of the household.
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stunting rates were almost identical in 1993 and 2008, at
24.5% and 24.6% respectively, and the second lowest rate of
21.6% was recorded in 1999 (various sources, discussed in
Devereux and Waidler 2017).15
Both sets of indicators pre-date the introduction of the
Child Support Grant in 1998 and both reveal no clear associ-
ation between social grants and either food security or nutri-
tion outcomes. Self-reported food security was already im-
proving for children before the CSG was introduced, and chil-
dren’s nutrition status has not improved significantly since
then. This is surprising for two reasons. Firstly, the number
of poor and food insecure children reached by the CSG has
increased dramatically since 1998, from just 34,000 children
under 7 years old in 1998 to more than 11 million children up
to 18 years of age in 2013 (Beukes et al. 2015). In 2012, social
grants made the single largest contribution to income in poor
households (42%), more than wages (32%) (Stats SA 2012).
There are several reasons why social grants are failing to
reduce malnutrition significantly in South Africa (discussed in
more detail in Devereux and Waidler (2017)). First, although
social grants in South Africa are relatively generous in com-
parison with cash transfer programmes in other countries, they
are not sufficient to meet nutritional needs, as food prices are
rising and social grants are not index-linked (e.g. the annual
increment of the Child Support Grant is typically a modest
R10 or R20, irrespective of inflation rates). Two other impor-
tant reasons are dilution among other individuals and other
cash needs, and deductions made by service providers, some-
times illegally. Regarding the former, social grants targeted at
individuals rather than households face being ‘diluted’ in two
ways: firstly, in terms of who they are spent on, and secondly
in terms of what they are spent on. Both forms of dilution can
reduce the impacts on the intended beneficiaries. A qualitative
evaluation of the CSG confirmed that the CSG cash is used for
a diverse range of food and non-food needs by recipients
(DSD, SASSA and UNICEF 2011). In terms of the latter,
the Department of Social Development (DSD) introduced a
payment system for social grants that uses bank accounts and
SASSA payment cards – rather than manual disbursement of
cash transfers – for several reasons, including: to reduce leak-
ages due to fraud and corruption, and to facilitate financial
inclusion of the poor and to reduce their vulnerability to ex-
ploitative money-lenders. However, giving bank accounts to
beneficiaries also gave opportunities to a range of service
providers to make unauthorised deductions from these bank
accounts, such as for airtime by cellphone companies and for
funeral policies by insurance companies (DSD 2016). Finally,
nutrition requires more than food. UNICEF’s conceptual
framework for the determinants of child malnutrition
(UNICEF 1990) identified three ‘underlying causes’ of child
malnutrition: inadequate access to food, inadequate care for
children and women, and insufficient health services and un-
healthy environment. Only the first of these can be directly
attributed to poverty – not enough resources at the individual
or household level to acquire adequate food.
8 Conclusion
Large numbers of South Africans receive social grants (public
transfers) or remittances (private transfers), yet the levels of
food insecurity – particularly in terms of nutritional outcomes
– are surprisingly high. In this paper we have attempted to
estimate the effects of (or associations among) both social
grants and remittances on (and) food security and nutrition,
as well as to see whether impacts differ among these three
transfers (the Child Support Grant, the Older Person’s Grant
and remittances). While several studies have attempted to es-
timate the relationship between one of these transfers on nu-
trition or food security, there is no study comparing all three
transfers.
15 These figures are not directly comparable, as different sampling frames and
age cohorts were used.
Table 7 Conditional logits – odds
ratios of being food secure, not
underweight, not overweight
Food secure (DDI) Food secure (expenditure) Not underweight Not overweight
PC CSG 1.001** 1.000 0.999 1.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PC OPG 1.001** 1.000 1.001 1.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PC 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999
Remittances (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 12,750 10,600 1464 3506
Pseudo R2 0.007 0.02 0.067 0.064
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses; Full models in appendix; + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05,
** p < 0.01.
Control variables included household size and composition, income before transfers, living in rural, urban infor-
mal or urban formal areas, year and education of the household.
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In this paper we found a significant and positive effect of
the Older Person’s Grant on the dietary diversity index (DDI),
but not of the Child Support Grant. The differences in impacts
between the CSG and the OPG correspond to differences in
the size of the transfers, as well as to the fact that the CSGmay
be spent not only on children and on needs other than food.
Remittances also improved the DDI (although to a lower ex-
tent), which is in line with other findings that remittances in
South Africa are spent on food (especially when they are re-
ceived by poor households).
We found no significant effects of either the Child Support
Grant, the Older Person’s Grant or remittances on total house-
hold expenditure on food. As noted above, this is an ambigu-
ous indicator because households can afford to spend more on
food as their income rises, but because spending on food is
relatively income-inelastic, households with rising incomes
allocate steadily declining proportions of their total expendi-
ture to food.
Regarding nutrition, we found no effect on anthropometry
(BMI) by OPG or remittances, which supports other findings
– both from South Africa as well as from other countries – that
grants and remittances do not have a consistent positive im-
pact on nutrition. On the other hand, however, some estimates
point towards a positive effect of the CSG on children’s BMI.
This is in line with previous studies in South Africa, which
have found positive nutritional outcomes of the Child Support
Grant. One reason why we only observed positive impacts
from this transfer could be the fact that the grant is targeted
at children and there is a clear message from the government
that the money should improve children’s nutritional
outcomes.
In absence of randomisation in the selection of social grants
or remittance recipients, as well as in the absence of baseline
data collected before the first migration episode or before the
launch of the social protection programmes, this paper relies
on quasi-experimental techniques of policy evaluation to deal
with endogeneity. Moreover, instruments were not available
for some of the transfers, and therefore we should be cautious
in claiming causality. Another feature that has posed method-
ological challenges is the small overlap between social grants
and remittance beneficiaries. Comparing the effects of remit-
tances and social assistance in the same estimation when
groups of recipients are highly heterogeneous can be problem-
atic. However, this is a finding per se, as it indicates that
remittances and social transfers reach different population
groups.
Being aware of the importance of different strategies
households rely upon to improve their well-being is important
and can inform policy making in different ways. The case
study of South Africa shows that different factors, such as
whether transfers are targeted to a specific individual or at
entire households, the size of the transfers, and themotivations
for sending these transfers, influence the impact that remit-
tances and social grants have on food security. Moroever,
and despite in South Africa social protection transfers have
significantly higher coverage than remittances (and, therefore,
they are more likely to contribute to poverty reduction), trans-
fers reach different population groups, which means different
households rely on different social protection strategies.
Moreover, in some cases, public and private transfers comple-
ment each other, as very poor households are likely to receive
both social grants and remittances.
There are many lessons that the governments of South
Africa and other countries can draw from these findings.
Firstly, food security and nutrition security are not the same.
Improvements in food security can be recorded with no con-
comitant improvement in nutrition status, so both sets of indi-
cators must be monitored and specific interventions must be
designed and delivered to tackle each. Secondly, it is
Table 9 Average treatment effects of the Child Support Grant on DDI





Radius matching 0.24 0.29 0.82 38,606
Nearest neighbor (3) 0.14 0.17 0.82 38,606
BMI adults
Radius matching 0.59 0.82 0.71 16,512
Nearest neighbor (3) 0.71 0.51 1.40 16,512
BMI children
Radius matching 0.50 0.23 2.18 3861
Nearest neighbor (3) 0.39 0.15 2.63 3861
Source: authors’ calculations based onNIDS 2008 and 2010. Coefficients
of the average treatment effects on the treated which were significant are
highlighted in bold. All the variables used to predict the treatment were
balanced after matching. The results from the probit regression estimating
the probability of receiving the CSG, and statistics of the quality of
matching are shown in appendix
Table 8 Fixed effects IV estimates of the effects of the Older Person’s
Grant on DDI and nutrition
DDI BMI adults BMI children
Receives OPG 0.63*** 0.20 0.24
(0.13) (0.35) (0.23)
Observations 38,936 16,700 3908
F statistic first stage 583 249 66
PC OPG 0.0012*** 0.0004 0.0005
(0.03) (0.07) (0.05)
Observations 38,936 16,700 3908
F statistic first stage 563 243 64
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; control
variables are omitted here to save space but are the same ones used in the
previous estimates.
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unrealistic to expect poor and food insecure people to rely on
informal support from others, rather than on formal social
assistance from the state. It is clear, for instance, that remit-
tances are accessed only by certain households, are unpredict-
able in terms of their frequency and value and, crucially, are
not necessarily pro-poor since they require labour mobility.
Conversely, well-designed social grants are characterised by
their predictability (regular delivery and fixed payments) and
they usually aim to reach the poorest and most food insecure.
Thirdly, the most direct way to maximise the impact of
social grants is to increase payment amounts, given the evi-
dence that grants targeted at individuals are also spent on other
household members and for multiple purposes other than
food. Fourthly, however, income transfers increase access to
food but not necessarily nutrition outcomes. Holistic ap-
proaches to tackling malnutrition are needed that address food
as well as non-food determinants, such as access to health
care, sanitation facilities and potable water. Education cam-
paigns on the importance of dietary diversity, hygienic prac-
tices and exclusive breastfeeding for the first six months are
equally important. Such campaigns have been found to be
most effective when provided as ‘BCC’messaging along with
cash transfers – so-called ‘cash plus’ interventions (Roelen
et al. 2017).
Finally, following from this insight, perhaps the most im-
portant lesson is that solutions to social policy problems need
to be problem-focused, not intervention-driven. Countries
across the world that have succeeded in dramatically reducing
malnutrition have done so by setting this as a goal (cf. Brazil’s
‘Zero Hunger’ initiative), and then done whatever is needed to
achieve this, across several sectors – health, education, agri-
culture, social protection (see Gillespie et al. 2016). This ap-
proach has proved more effective than selecting one policy
instrument, such as cash transfers, and expecting it to solve
food insecurity and malnutrition on its own.
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Appendix
Table 10 Descriptive statistics of
the variables used in the analysis Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Dietary diversity index 9.41 2.34 1 12
BMI adults 26.19 6.55 15.1 50
BMI children (zbmi) 0.03 1.4 −4.97 4.99
PC CSG 37.82 53.36 0 1371.68
PC OPG 56.88 130.46 0 1061.95
PC remittances 19.20 363.30 0 43,333.33
PC income before transfers 801.95 2312.66 0 131,838
Number of adults 3.75 2.24 0 37
Number of children 2.01 1.80 0 12
Urban formal 0.39 0.49 0 1
Rural 0.55 0.50 0 1
Urban informal 0.06 0.25 0 1
No education 0.23 0.42 0 1
Years 1–4 0.17 0.37 0 1
Years 5–7 0.17 0.38 0 1
Years 7–12 0.27 0.44 0 1
Metrics 0.16 0.37 0 1
Source: authors’ calculations; NIDS 2008 and 2010
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Table 11 Effect of transfers on
dietary diversity index Fixed effects Ordered probit
DDI DDI DDI DDI
Whole sample African sample Recipients Whole sample
PC CSG 0.000 0.001+ 0.001 −0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PC OAP 0.001** 0.001** 0.002** 0.000**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PC remittances 0.000* 0.000* 0.000 0.000**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PC income before transfers 0.000** 0.000* 0.000** 0.000**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Number of adults 0.080** 0.082** 0.052* 0.025**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00)
Number of children −0.062+ −0.067+ −0.090* 0.014**
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.00)
Urban formal 1.187** 1.546** 2.655** 0.381**
(0.27) (0.24) (0.44) (0.02)
Urban informal 1.263** 1.457** 0.991 0.237**
(0.32) (0.32) (0.72) (0.03)
Maximum level of education in the household
Years 1–4 0.089 0.086 −0.070 0.026
(0.13) (0.15) (0.18) (0.02)
Years 5–7 0.097 0.114 −0.209 0.016
(0.18) (0.20) (0.24) (0.02)
Years 7–12 0.190 0.197 −0.137 0.076**
(0.22) (0.24) (0.30) (0.02)
Metrics 0.163 0.119 −0.189 0.269**
(0.27) (0.29) (0.37) (0.02)
Year 2008 −0.043 −0.071 −0.195** −0.123**
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.01)
Constant 8.498** 8.079** 8.092**
(0.24) (0.23) (0.34)
Observations 37,057 30,803 24,731 36,838
Within R2 0.01 0.02 0.04
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Panel weights were used, except in the case of the
last specification as weights are not allowed for random effects models
Random effects ordered probit also controls for race, location (province), housing and living conditions, number
of household members employed, and maximum age in the household
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Table 12 Effect of transfers on







Recipients Whole sample Whole
sample
PC CSG −0.001 −0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PC OAP −0.000 −0.001 0.000 −0.001** −0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PC remittances −0.000 −0.000 0.001 −0.000 −0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PC income before
transfers
0.000+ 0.000 −0.000 0.000** 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Number of adults −0.017 −0.013 0.083 −0.084** 0.011
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02)
Number of children −0.180* −0.174* −0.236* −0.114** −0.241**
(0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.04) (0.04)
Urban formal −0.473 −0.339 1.123 1.073** 0.591
(0.57) (0.63) (1.03) (0.16) (0.48)
Urban informal 0.160 0.233 −0.022 0.746** 0.743
(0.85) (0.87) (1.55) (0.26) (0.71)
Maximum level of education in the household
Years 1–4 −1.522+ −1.019 −1.504 0.415 −1.335*
(0.78) (0.89) (1.01) (0.25) (0.62)
Years 5–7 0.379 0.593 −0.369 −0.279 0.345
(0.73) (0.77) (0.76) (0.22) (0.73)
Years 7–12 1.157 1.222 0.116 −1.121** 1.196
(0.77) (0.81) (0.80) (0.19) (0.75)
Metrics 1.644* 1.555+ 0.950 −0.278 1.958*
(0.80) (0.84) (0.86) (0.21) (0.79)
Year 2008 −0.678** −0.774** −0.820** −0.871** −0.641**
(0.11) (0.12) (0.16) (0.07) (0.08)
Constant 26.423** 26.236** 26.498** 29.217** 29.328**
(0.73) (0.75) (0.85) (0.31) (0.41)
Observations 15,875 13,513 10,132 15,875 15,875
Within R2 0.03 0.04 0.06
Overall R2 0.16 0.17
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; Panel weights were used, except in the case of the
last specification as weights are not allowed for random effects models. Random and Mundlak estimates also
control for race, location (province), housing and living conditions, number of householdmembers employed, and
maximum age in the household
696 J. Waidler, S. Devereux
Table 13 Effect of transfers on children BMI
Fixed effects Random effects Mundlak
Whole sample African sample Recipients Whole sample Whole sample
PC CSG −0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PC OAP 0.002+ 0.002* 0.002 0.000 0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PC remittances 0.001 0.001 −0.000 0.000 −0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PC income before transfers 0.000 −0.000 0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Number of adults 0.017 0.009 0.042 0.010 0.019
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
Number of children 0.036 0.028 0.020 −0.043** −0.030
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04)
Urban formal 0.654 0.777 0.386 0.223** 0.398
(0.48) (0.50) (0.37) (0.08) (0.57)
Urban informal −1.271* −1.161+ −0.626+ 0.148 −0.378
(0.64) (0.63) (0.36) (0.12) (0.60)
Maximum level of education in the household
Years 1–4 0.014 0.007 −0.002 0.058 0.095
(0.12) (0.13) (0.15) (0.08) (0.11)
Years 5–7 0.110 0.108 0.067 0.122 0.188
(0.18) (0.19) (0.22) (0.10) (0.16)
Years 7–12 0.350 0.471+ 0.376 0.262 0.536+
(0.26) (0.28) (0.30) (0.18) (0.27)
Metrics 0.000 0.031 0.403* 0.260 0.231
(0.22) (0.22) (0.19) (0.92) (1.14)
Year 2008 −0.061 −0.053 −0.074 −0.041 0.004
(0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.07)
Constant −0.328 −0.223 −0.398 0.260 0.208
(0.29) (0.29) (0.28) (0.16) (0.22)
Observations 3780 3361 2857 3680 3680
Within R2 0.02 0.02 0.02
Overall 0.08 0.06
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; Panel weights were used, except in the case of the last specification as weights are not
allowed for random effects models. Random and Mundlak estimates also control for race, location (province), housing and living conditions, number of
household members employed, maximum age in the household and characteristics of the child that can influence their nutritional status (whether the
mother is alive, and health status); all these variables have the expected sign and most of them are statistically significant
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Table 14 Conditional logits – Odds ratios of being food secure, not underweight, not overweight
Food secure (DDI) Food secure (expenditure) Not underweight Not overweight
PC CSG 1.001** 1.000 0.999 1.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PC OAP 1.001** 1.000 1.001 1.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PC remittances 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PC income before transfers 1.000** 1.000 1.000 1.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Number of adults 1.015 1.031** 0.919* 1.001
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03)
Number of children 0.926** 1.098** 1.056 0.876*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.09) (0.05)
Urban formal 2.699** 2.151** 0.348+ 0.851
(0.59) (0.42) (0.20) (0.28)
Urban informal 0.993 2.662** 0.932 0.825
(0.34) (0.85) (1.05) (0.40)
Maximum level of education in the household
Years 1–4 0.975 1.044 1.016 0.657
(0.10) (0.12) (1.29) (0.37)
Years 5–7 0.994 1.385* 0.145 2.268
(0.14) (0.21) (0.21) (1.62)
Years 7–12 0.970 1.596* 0.054+ 2.975
(0.17) (0.31) (0.08) (2.13)
Metrics 0.965 1.410 0.039* 4.711*
(0.23) (0.37) (0.06) (3.54)
Year 1 0.859** 1.327** 1.365** 0.629**
(0.03) (0.05) (0.14) (0.04)
Observations 12,750 10,600 1464 3506
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
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Table 15 Probit regression used





Race (ref category: Black)
Coloured −0.06**
(0.01)
Other (Asian or White) −0.38**
(0.02)
Child in the household Age 13–16 years old 0.08**
(0.01)
Child in the household Age 9–12 years old 0.14**
(0.01)
Child in the household Age 5–8 years old 0.18**
(0.01)






Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Coefficients are expressed as average marginal
effects
Table 16 Matching quality
Sample Ps R2 p > chi2 Mean bias Median bias
Unmatched 0.19 0.00 38.2 39.2
Matched 0.00 0.71 0.8 0.6
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Table 17 Effects of transfers on dietary diversity for different transfer recipient groups
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PC remittances 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PC CSG 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PC OPG 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Income PC before transfers 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Number of adults 0.073** 0.073** 0.078** 0.074** 0.079** 0.079** 0.080**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Number of children −0.063+ −0.066* −0.065* −0.063+ −0.065* −0.062+ −0.062+
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Urban formal 1.148** 1.123** 1.166** 1.146** 1.165** 1.189** 1.187**
(0.27) (0.26) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27)
Urban informal 1.237** 1.220** 1.243** 1.238** 1.245** 1.261** 1.263**
(0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32)
Maximum level of education in the household
Years 1–4 0.087 0.088 0.090 0.087 0.090 0.089 0.089
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Years 5–7 0.092 0.096 0.103 0.091 0.102 0.098 0.097
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Years 7–12 0.187 0.192 0.198 0.185 0.196 0.192 0.190
(0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22)
Metrics 0.163 0.171 0.176 0.161 0.173 0.165 0.163
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